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Chapter I : 
The Presence o f  the Past: 
Culture, Opinion and Iden t i t y  i n  Germany 
KonradcH. Jarausch, Hinricn C. Seeba and David P. Conradt 
History plays a central role in the creation of national 
identity. According to one prominent definition, a nation's sense 
of self is the result of appropriated experiences, "the sum of . 
remembrances of its own political behavior."' In practice, groups 
represent their fate in stories which create e feeling of community 
by recounting their trials and tribulations. Often dramatic 
incidents like the storming of the Bastille function as political 
founding myths that are told and retold, not to remember certain 
facts, but to establish a bond between past and present that might 
unite speakers and listeners. In the construction of such national 
identities actual events matter less than their careful arrangement 
in a master narrative that presents a highly selective but all the 
nore compelling account of common destiny.' 
A classic case of such an invented tradition is the Prussian 
conception of history that emerged in mid-19th century. A group of 
national and liberal historians and publicists appropriated certain 
aspects of the Central European past in order to justify Berlin's 
conquests which led to the unification of Germany. Though they 
differed on the need for a constitution, both Beinrich von Sybel 
and Heinrich von Treitschke agreed on a master plot that departed 
from the glory of the Holy Roman Empire and deplored German decline 
due to religious quarrels, territorial splits and foreign interfe- 
rence, only to celebrate redemption through the national movenent 
and ~ismarck s unif icaticn wars. By selecting some strsnds and 
ignoring others, these Borussian historians sought to legitimize 
the Protestant and k l e i n a e u t s c h  reign of the Hohenzollerns over the 
Second Empire at the expense of the Catholic anti gro f ideu t sch  rest.3 
In contrast to this success story, events of the 20th century 
proved deeply problematic due to Geman responsibility for the two 
World Wars. In some ways, the nationalist invention of the stab-in- 
the-back-legend tried to repeat the plot structure of earlier pro- 
minence in the Empire and present decline in the Weimar Republic so 
as to call for German recovery in a revived Third Reich. After the 
failure of neo-ccnservative alternatives, this nope materialized as 
Hitlerls dictatorship, surpassing all expectations, first in resto- 
ring national pride and then ending in renewed catastrophe. Only 
the collapse of 1945 broke this cyclical pattern by revealing to 
the survivors the full extent of the "German catastrophen that 
seemed beyond hope of redemption the second time ar~und.~ To explain 
the inex?licable, critics simply inverted the old master plot and 
constructed a negative teleology towards an inevitabie defeat of 
the Prusso-German state through its Nazi exaggeration, apparently 
ending the story forever. 
In this narrative, the postwar period functioned largely as a 
post-script, an ahistorical space of prolonged penitence for pre- 
vious transgressions. In light of the unprecedented horror of the 
crimes committed in its name, German identity could only continue 
to exist as a thorough renunciation of earlier affirmations of 
Gernanness. The East therefore embraced anti-fascism, partly in 
genuine revulsion and partly as prop for the SED regime, while the 
West struggled to cope with the past through a curious mixture of 
repression and restitution.' This endless task of ~ergangenheitsbe-  
waltigung strangely linked both rival offsprings of the ~hird 2eich 
and continued to embarrass their Leaders during various anniversa- 
ries. Though the population wanted to forget what might not be for- 
given, critical intellectuals on both sides of the wall becune 
preoccupied with guilt that negatively defined them as Germans 
through the imperative of atonement 
The unification of 1989-90 has offered an unexpected continu- 
2 ,  ation of the erstwhile master narrative by providing a new redemp- 
tion. While the left now worries about the doubling of the burden 
of the past, the right sees the return of unity as a chance to undo 
the effects of the culturpl revolution of the 1960s and to restore 
a s  . a positive sense of identity. Many of the current debates on the 
, . =  . Stasi legacy, the collabcration of writers, the morality of 
O s t p o l i t i k ,  etc. can be understood as clumsy attenpts to rewrite 
history in order to renationalize Germany.' This open-ended contest 
for cultural hegemony poses several important questions: Which 
symbolic traditions originally shaped German self-consciousness and 
may continue to color the larger FRG? What historical learning 
processes transformed public opinion after the war and are likely 
to.detemine the politicai behavior of united Germany? And which 
current appropriations of the past will inform its national self- 
conceptions in the future? 
1. The Cultural Construction of Germanness: 
369 
Due to the lack of a national state, the creation of a German 
identity was, above all, a cultural project. Frustrated with the 
particularism of petty principalities after the Seven Years' War, 
the educated sougnt to reinvent a common polity, based upon the 
bond of language, literature and tradition, shared among the 
peoples of Central Europe. Since the real history of Geman 
speakers was pre- and transnational, an imagined past had to be 
created that could serve as symbolic representation of a national 
unity that was to be restored.' In the construction of a sense of 
self, several strains of arguments about German traditions emerged 
that came to vie with each other: an aesthetic view that was 
content to stress the bonds of common culture, a liberal view that 
put a premium on constitutional freedom and an ethnic view that 
emphasized national unity. In some fashion or other, these re- 
latively set visions would structure the debate on Geman self- 
conceptions over the space of two centuries. 
As precondition for a political revival, Germany had to be 
conceived of as a cultural community. In the second half of the 
18th century some intellectuals began to complain that the Boly Ro- 
man Empire provided but a weak link between over three hundred 
sovereign territorial states, imperial cities and knightly posses- 
sions. Friedrich Carl von Moser was among the first who, in his 
book Von dem deutschen Nationalgeist (1765), lzmented an alarming 
degree of collective alienation among the diverse German provinces: 
"We no longer know ourselves; / We have become estranged from one 
.another, / Our spirit has left us." In promoting governmental re- 
form, Moser argued for "a German interest" as a rallying point for 
better integration of what appeared to be a rather heterogeneous, 
localized c~lture.~ As struggle against parochialism, the inceptior? 
of nationalism was linked to a project of political modernization. 
The formation of a German identity, therefore, began with an 
aesthetic campaign for establishing a "cultural nation." In 1766 
Gottlob Ephraim Lessing still ridiculed "the bright idea of crea- 
ting a national theater for the Germans as long as we Germans are 
not yet a nation. "I0 But when the hopes for a political revival of 
the Holy Roman Empire began to fade, Friedrich Schiller chose the 
opposite direction, recommending the creation of a German theater 
. . as the best path to political unity: "If we were to have a national 
stage, we would also become a nation."" Leading to the comforting 
notion of cultural nation, this aesthetic perspective became the 
dominant outlook of the Bildungsburgertum in the 19th century. In 
accordance with Schillerls distych of 1795 "Germany? But where is 
it? I :don't know how to find that country. / Where the learned one 
begins, the political one ends,"" the gradual disappearance of the 
political Gemany, would be balanced by the emergence of a symbolic 
Gelmany represented culturally. 
In the search for a common denominator, educated promoters of 
the national revival could appeal to a common language. In his - Wor- 
terbuch der Deutschen Sprache (1807), Johann Heinrich Cape argued 
that in view of the political misery following the Prussian defeat 
at Jena and Auerstedt nothing would be "more necessary, pressing 
and valuzble" than to strengthen the German sense of linguistic 
cohesicn. After the break-up of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, 
their lanmage, the last string to hold together the German people, 
was believed to be the only hope for "the possibility of future re- 
unification into an independent nation. " I 3  Thus Wiedervereinigung, a 
key word of the political debates in post-war Germany, was used 
already 150-years earlier to champion a predominantly philological 
venture. From the beginning, much of the discourse on "cultural 
nation" was cast in a rhetoric of regaining a mythical political 
unity which had been lost. 
Historiographers of national literature such as Ludwig Wachler 
(1818) and August Koberstein (1827) sought to create an ethnic mas- 
ter narrative.I4 Often constructing, like A. F. C. Vilmar in his 
popular work of 1844,'' a mythological origin of ethnic Germans, 
this tale of national development tried to construct a plot that 
departed from a golden age, declined to the present and hoped for 
future redemption. Tracing the Germans1 tribal identity back to 
minius (a renegade officer who had beaten the Romans in 9 A.D., 
thus bolstering Germanic pride forever) and to Siegfried (a 
mythical figure who would kill any enemy disguised as a ghastly 
dragon, thus becoming the quintessential Germanic hero) turned into 
the favorite (and richly rewarded) pastime of mythologizers. It was 
mainly to honor his popular edition of the Nibelungenlied that a 
minor philologist, Friedrich Heinrich von der Hagen, was appointed 
the first professor of German literature at the newly founded 
university of Berlin in 1810. 
Other intellectuals attempted to advance a constitutional na- 
tion state through creating a literary canon and promoting lingu- 
istic standardization. In his pivotal Geschichte der poetischen 
National-Literatur der Deutscnen (1835-42) the historian Georg 
Gottfriea Gervinus set out to strengthen German identity through 
the constructicn of a literary pantheon. Especially after Weimar 
classicism had ended with Goethels death in 1832, literature seemed 
to present khe nost significant, if not the only, point of 
reference on which all Germans, however divided they were, could 
agree. 16 "What do we have in common beyond our language and 
literature?" similarly asked Jacob Grim in 1854 when he set out to 
collect Germany's linguistic memory in his Deutsches Worterbuch. 
Through documenting the richness of the common language, the 
founder of the academic study of Gemanis t i k ,  hoped to speed the 
-- establishment of a common state." 
A second major strand in the cultural formation of German 
identity was the liberal rhetoric of individual freedom. With the 
celebrated drama of Swiss liberation from Hapsburg control, Wilhelm 
Tell (1804), Friedrich Schiller issued a stirring call for liberty -
. . &  in the,.Riitli oath: "We want to be as free as our fathers were!" 
Forced to shoot an apple from his son's head and taking revenge on 
his torturer, the protagonist William Tell became a powerful symbol 
of the desire for political freedom which stirred the popular 
imagination. Censors, still afraid that "freedom' meant "revolu- 
tion," and ever cauticus stage directors insisted on changing the 
text of the drama, elinhated the subversive fifth act or ba~ned 
the celebrated liberation drama altogether. If staged at all, the 
play was at least barred from repeat perfoknances (e.g. 1832 in 
Frankfurt, 1846 in Mainz) after the audience ostentatiously had 
applauded lines that could be seen as directed against the German 
authorities of the day." 
The easy accessibility of Schiller's message made the poet im- 
mensely popular as spokesman for German liberation. The famous 
lines from Don Carlos, "Give freedom of thought, sire!" could be 
interpreted-as support for cultural quietism or, in connection with 
other plays like Die Rauber, seen as demand for actual political 
freedom. Popular fervor culminated in the "Schiller year" 1859 when 
nation-wide commemorations of Schiller's one-hundredth birthday re- 
iterated the call of the 1848 revolution for liberalization and 
unification. "The spiritual celebration 'of unity," writes the edi- 
tor of a two-volume anthology of speeches on that occasion "was a 
firm foundation for the great edifice which we will yet labor for 
centuries to build."19 No wonder that more monume~lts were dedicated 
to the "poet of freedom" than to any other German figure and that 
the national foundation for supporting indigent writers bore his 
name. 
During much of tne 19th century Liberals promoted their cause 
by producing their own historical iconography. As alternative to 
the black and white Prussian flag, supporters of constitutionalism 
embraced the black-red-gold tricolor of the Burschenschaft, the 
liberal and national student movement that arose after the War of 
Liberation and was repeatedly persecuted by restoration autfiori- 
ties.m During the Hambach festival (1832) and the 1848 Revolution, 
radicals tried to introduce French symbols of Republicanism such as 
pnrygian caps, and American-style propaganda like songs and 
broadsides. The middle class effort to build a statute to  herm ma^ 
the German" in the Teutoburg Forest was also a national-liberal at- 
tempt to celebrate "liberationn frcm foreign domination. Inspired 
by solidarity with the Commune, the Socialist movement adopted the 
red banner of revolt so as to suggest that it followed a powerful 
revolutionary tradition, in tune with the march of history." 
The effect of liberal appeals wes, however, blunted by the 
unsolved question of national cnity. In Schiller's play Wilhelm 
Tell the first line of the oath of the Swiss confederation, "We 
want to be a united folk of brethren,"" served as :the fictional 
battle cry for national unity by turning the iaternal demand for 
freedom into m external cry for liberation from oppression. This 
vow was frantically applauded in August 1870, when during the 
Franco-Prussian.War the theater season ir, Berlin was opened with 
Wilhelm   ell." It was applauded again at the end of World War One, 
when the call for unity was used to balance the military defeat and 
economic misery.z4 It was applauded durinq the Third Reich when the 
Nazi movement claimed to be the true heir of all national tradi- 
tions.?Finally, it was applauded in 1951, when following the 
Berlin blockade the newly built Schillertneater was opened with 
this play and the Berliners rallied to withstand the Cold War.= 
As inspiration for resistance against Napoleon's occupation, 
nationalist intellectuals demanded moving towards actual politics. 
In his. Reden an die deutsche Natiorr (1808) the philosopher Johann 
Gottlieb Fichte lectured the Germans to act politically rather than 
to retreat into the realn of intellect: "Long before recent events 
we have had to hear so to speak in advance what has been repeated 
frequently since, that even if our political independence were 
lost, we would nonetheless keep our language =d literature and 
would always remain a nation in thess respects and could easily 
console ourselves about everything else."" In Fichte's view such 
cultural solace, later called "inner emigratioo," would amount to 
defeatism, because internalizing the site of identity in imagina- 
tion would mean the end of political resistance. Echoed by Fried- 
rich Ludwig Jahn and Ernst Moritz Amdt, this philosophical call to 
arms inspired an exclusive, ethnic definition of German identity. 
In conjuring up times of paradise, golden age and holy empire, 
other intellectuals invoked the triadic myth of restored unity, 
associated with the heroic "Emperor Barbaros~a."~ This figment of 
national imagination was constructed from two historical figures, 
Frederick I, who reigned between 1155 and 1190, and his grandson 
Frederick 11, who reigned from 1212 to 1250. Barbarossa was be- 
lieved to be condemned to wait in the Kyffhauser mountain for 
hundreds of years until his time would come to wake up to rid Ger- 
many of the divisive regional princes and to restore the unified 
"Reich" in its medieval, imperial, i.e,, centralized grandeur. This 
late medieval myth took on new slynificance, when after the col- 
lapse of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, only one generation before 
its one-thousandth anniversary, the nostalgic drem of the empire 
lost turned into the drive for a national state to be regained. 
Ironically, this vision was revived by a single poem by Fried- 
rich Riickert, "Kaiser Friedrich im Kyffhauser" (1817). In addition 
to all the elements of the popular tale -- the emperor dozing for 
another hundred years deep down in the mountain, with his red beard 
grown through the marble table and the ravens keeping watch -- this . 
evocation suggests an identity that conflates the old Empire with a 
hoped-for nation state: "He has taken away / the Reich's glorious 
shine, / and shall return one day / With it, in his own time.nw As 
it was a "holy1' empire -- named for the fact that the medieval 
emperor had to be crowned by the pope --, the image easily took on, 
in the triadic scheme of history, a quasi-religious quality of 
paradise lost and regained, with the cyclical nature of events to 
come expressed in the prefix "Wieaer-." As restoration of past 
bliss in a timeless millenium the dream of re-unification would 
lift the old curse of fragmentation and dispel the recent nightmare 
of defeat which signified the end of former "unity" as the dawning 
of modernity. 
.,b - Due to the mythical character of such cultural constructions, 
the transition from K u l t u r n a t i o n  to N a t i o n a l s t a a t  would exact a 
heavy price. The liberal Karl Biederxnmn insisted in his entry on 
"nation, nationalityn to Rotteck/Welckerls famed ~taats-Lexikon 
that "the culture of a common lanwage and literature does not suf- 
fice in order to create a fully developed nation and a generally 
capable national chara~ter."~ But in qoing from culture to politics 
the goal of personal freedom often lost out to the connected.but 
yet distinct aim of national unity when the two clashed with each 
other. In Hoffmann von Fallersleben's text of 1841 for what was to 
become Germany's national anthem in 1922 and again in 1952,31 the 
call for "unityw soon proved more popular than .claims to "right and 
freedom." While the liberal Bieaermacn argued for civil liberty at 
the domestic level, national critics tnrned the language of freedom 
into a call for unification by demanding liberation from foreign 
oppression. 
In the struggle for a separate identity, definitions of what 
ought to be considered German narrowed decisively. Based on the 
cosmopolitan project of Enlightenment, the 18th century was marked 
by a certain pride in cultural heterogeneity, with Justus Moser, 
among others, praising the aesthetics of local diversity to counter 
Frederick 11's contempt for German provin~iaiism.~~ After Napoleon's 
defeat the homogenizing forces in German identity forraation grew 
stronger, since the negative foil of an external enemy was replaced 
by the problem of defining standards of Germanness internally. The 
emphatic criteria of what Ludwig Wachler preached in 1818 as 
"return to a German spiritn" increasingly became the yardstick of 
de-selection, excluding everybody who could be identified outside 
"Germandom" such as members of other linguistic minorities. This 
redefinition of what it meant to be Geman from a cultural into a 
racial pattern was the milieu in which anti-Semitism, the most 
hostile exclusion of the "other," couia eventually thrive.% 
Unpersuaded by such efforts, perceptive critics tried to ex- 
pose the anachronistic 'fictionality of German claims to unity. 
Although even Heinrich Heine liked to play with a liberal version 
of the Barbarossa mytht3' he realized in more sober moments that the 
Germans,'like the Jews, were still waiting in vain for their "secu- 
lar Messiah. 'I" During the Vormarz the exiled poet, therefore, 
considered the hope for any "reunification" of the Germans as a 
nostalgic and anti-modern return to a kind of totality which, if it 
ever existed, was assigned to a mythological past. If there the 
world had ever been united before, it was preserved, Heine argued, 
if not created, by "whole poets" whc were restricted to antiquity 
and the middle ages. They should be respected but not be enulated; 
for "every imitation of their wholeness is a lie, a lie wnich any 
clear eye can see and which cannot escape ridicule. "'' 
In the-first three-quaters of the 19th century the cultural 
and political struggle over German identity remained undecided. On 
the one hand, the building of roads and canals, the growth of 
railroads and the construction of telegraphs began to link the 
Central European states more closely. Also the Prussian-led effort 
to forge a customs union freed trade across petty frontiers while 
newspapers and book publishers started to cater to a national 
opinion market. But on the other had, the efforts of countless 
civic associations, be they directed towards pursuits like singing 
' and gymnastics or be they openly political only slowly succeeded in 
wresting some constitutional concessions from the various crowns. 
The failure of the 1848 revolution doomed dynastic ~russian or 
? Austrian efforts to create a nation state so that the issue of 
political unity in Central Europe rmained an intellectual projsct 
rather than practical reality.% 
Only the founding of the Second Reich in 1871 seemed to settie 
the issue of Germaxmess once and for all. Bismarck's military tri- 
umphs strengthened the ethnic conception of identity and national 
fervor pushed advocates of diversity, tarred as Reichsfeinde, onto 
the sidelines. In order to instill a -miform civic consciousness, 
tne new Reich combatted political Catholicism in the Kulturkampf, 
reneged on Jewish emancipation by fostering racial anti-Seaitism 
and persecuted Socialism and trade-unionism. Bismarck ended the 
confrontation with Catholics when he needed the support of the 
Center Party and eventually shifted to social policy so as to wean 
workers away from Marxism.;' But once raised by the historian Hein- 
rich von Treitschke, the Jewish questionr4O would not go away, since 
many believed, like Julius Langbehn in i890, that it called for a 
solution "in a hostile sense."4' Instead of increasing liberality, 
the creation of the Second Empire reinforced the intolerant aspects 
of German identity. 
As support of the fragile new state, the Barbarossa myth could 
suggest a seemingly solid historical justification. In 1881 a group 
of nationalist and anti-Semitic students gathered on the Kyffhauser 
mountain to pledge eternal loyalty to "the resurrected Barbarossa, 
their beloved Emperor ~illiam."" A decade later construction began 
on a colossal monument which iconically juxtaposed Barbarossa's 
awakening and William 1's triumph: "On the Kyffhauser, where accor-' 
ding to myth Emperor Frederick the Redbeard waited for the renewal 
of the Reich, Emperor William the Whitebeard shall arise, who has 
fulfilled the legendmn4' The Kyffhauser manifests a series of cor- 
respondences in which RotSart is replaced by WeiBbart so as to 
prove that the newly founded Deutsches Reich was taking the place 
of the medieval empire, Typically, the dedication in 1896 took 
place on June 18, a date which marked the anniversaries of Barba- 
rossa's crowning, the Prussian victory over the Swedes in Fehrbel- 
lin, the defeat of Napoleon in Waterloo and the victory celebration 
in Berlin in 1871." 
To strengthen its political legitimacy, the Second Reich crea- 
ted a patriotic version of history to "nationalize the masses." The 
government sponsored national hoiidays such as the Emperor's birth- 
380 
day or Sedan's day (commemorating the victory over France), cele- 
brated with military parades, patriotic speeches and liberal con- 
sumption of alcohol. The Hohenzollern dynasty seized on occasiocs 
like opening schools, hospitals or railway stations, built in neo- 
medieval styie, to represent itself as a legitimate heir of the 
imperial tradition by affecting a chivalric pose. The educatedand 
propertied burghers sponsored a series of Bismarck columns to memo- 
rialize the founder of the Second Reich and constructed of a series 
of national monuments, such as the Pcrta Westfalica, the Leipzig 
tower to the War of Liberation, and the Riidesheim ~ermania."' Ampli- 
fied in schools, churches and barracks, this invented tradition of 
Geman.glory spread the nationalist gospel to the lower class. 
Unification-fundamentally transformed the outlook of the edu- 
cated middle class from a liberal to a nationalist stance. Before 
there had been a German state, the national movement had to advo- 
cate political change in order to overthrow the particularist prin- 
ces. But after i871, national agitation became defensive, intent on 
maintaining the newly gained state by making reliable German citi- 
zens out of a welter of different loyalties. Not content with in- 
ternal consolidation, ethnic radicals directed their agitation out- 
ward towards a pan-German gathering up of German-speaking minori- 
ties in Europe that had not been unified. Invoking a transition to 
Weltpolitik, nationalists also advocated imperialism, the creation 
0f.a world-wide empire for the German latecomers. Based upon a 
mythological reading of the imperial past, the voikish fringe and 
the Fatherland Party became ever more radical during World War One, 
advocating racist and linguistic suppression at home and military 
expansion a ~ r o a d . ~  
After the defeat and collapse of the Second Reich, the diffe- 
rent conceptions of German identity once again clashed. Democratic 
and socialist attempts to infuse the Weimar Republic with the coun- 
ter-tradition of liberty foundered on circumstances, incompetence 
and h~stility.~' When the Nazi Party succeeded in creating the neo- 
conservative dream of a Third Reich, it used specious logic in 
claiming to be the culmination of all prior national'dreans, a syn- 
thesis which would finally end internal strife and bring external 
might. At home, the SS and its collaborators radically attempted to 
homogenize ethnic conceptions of Gemandom in a biopolitical fa- 
shion that culminated in concentration camps and the Holocaust. 
Even if he was motivated by the association with "red" in "rea- 
beard," it was no accident that Hitler once again invoked the 
imperial myth by giving the attack on the Soviet Union, that would 
eventually bring him down, the code-name "operation Barbaros~a."~ 
By its shameless exaggeration of exceptionalism, the Third 
Reich made a travesty out of the tradition of a German S~nderweg.~' 
Domestically, Nazi chauvinism deeply discredited national defini- 
tions of Germanness by involving not just victims but also collabo- 
rators and perpetrators in sufferinq bombing raids and mass expul- 
sions. Internationally, Hitler's expansion of Germany far beyond 
its historical or linguistical borders abused the notion of self- 
determination as a flimsy cover for racial imperialism. Since the 
Wehmacht and the SS cammitted their atrocities in the name of the 
German people, they tarnished all claims connected to that concept 
for decades to come. The resistance effort of the previous elites 
or Communist workers was too little and too late to save older, 
more moderate definitions of national traditions." By destroying 
the national state and ruining the conception of a special 
identity, the Nazis also brought the Geman master narrative to an 
inglorious end. 
2. The Reshaping of National Identity After 1945: 
On the "allied reservation" in 1945 the question of Geman 
national identity was not a priority item on the cultural or 
-A-L. . political agenda. Viewed from the perspective of the 1990s it could 
- .  
.= : indeed be argued that between 1945 and 1989 the identity question, 
. -. like Barbarossa, had once again entered a long hibernation. Though 
the issue of self-definition after the historiczl catastrophe of 
the Third Reich continued to haunt German creams, bedevil acadenic 
discussions and inspire turgid treatises, it seemed at the same 
time curiously remote from the practical tasks of post-war survival 
and reconstruction. 
At the war's end, most Germans did not have the leisure to 
worry about how they felt about themselves. Wher. asked in surveys 
conducted in the American zone from October, 1945 to February, 1949 
what their "greatest cares and worries at the present timen were, 
the greet inajority mentioned food, clothing, shoes, POWs, and 
missing persons. After the June, 1948 currency reform "money 
troubles in generaln replaced food and clothing st the top of the 
list." By early 1947 most Germans in the American zone considered 
it unlikely that the Allies would leave behind a united Gemany at 
the end of the occupation and by August, 1948, nine months before 
the creation of the two German states, 70 percent favored the 
creation of a provisional government, with only 12 percent opposed 
to the idea. In supporting a separate West German goverrnent, the 
respondents were well aware that it would mean the continued, if 
not permanent division of the country." 
Division was also on the agenda of Germany's occupiers. By the 
late 1940s it was clear that neither the United States nor the 
Soviet Union were prepared to allow "theirn Germans to pursue 
policies that they could not control and that could possibly be 
directed against their interests. Each superpower wanted a single 
German state only on its own terms: a liberal, pluralistic demo- 
cratic state for the United States; a communist, worker and peasant 
state for the Soviet Union. Unable to achieve such a unified state 
without military conflict, the two superpowers reluctantly settled 
for two states each having the social, economic, and political 
characteristics of its respective protector. Ironically, the 
division of Germany enabled both states within a relatively short 
time to achieve a status within their respective power bloc that a 
single Geman state could never have attained. Yet, as Ralf Dahren- 
aorf has remarked, both German states in the 1950s thus lacked an 
integrating core; their respective political centers were Washing- 
ton and Moscow; they were both "floating in the air."53 They were 
not integrated social entities, but they lacked cohesion and an 
identity that would differentiate then from others. Perhaps 
.unification might provide that integrating substance in the future; 
the process of regaining unity itself could become an integrating 
force. 
Most Germans were indifferent to these fateful decisions of 
the Allies.,In the immediate postwar period, for understandable 
reasons, many wanted to forget about being German at all. After 
1945 an emotional vacuum took the place of the affective ar?d 
integrative ties which previously had linked the national commmity 
with political culture. This was in large part the consequence of 
the Nazi perversion of national sentiments and symbols. To fill the 
vacuum some Germans enthusiastically embraced the "European idea," 
a politically united Europe with no national borders, or gladly 
submitted to the "Americanization" so apparer'.t in popular culture. 
Most simply reduced their scope of allegiance to the self, the 
family, and perhaps the local community. This mass withdrawal to 
the primary sphere, or privatization, as some social scientists 
have termed it, gave German leaders considerable freedom of action 
but also imposed limits on the intensity of commitment or identifi- 
cation 'they could require from their  citizen^.^ 
Privatization was a reaction to the intense politicization of 
the Nazi period and to the dislocations caused by World War 11. 
Political leaders and critical inteilectuals therefore mace little 
headway with Vergangenhei tsbewal tig~ng in the first post-war years. 
The vast majority of Germans had other, more basic concercs such as 
how to put their lives back together, raise fatherless cnildren, 
forage for food, or simply try to replace the pots, pans,. dishes, 
linen, and other necessities of everyday life lost in air raids. 
Though it initially made Germany an anomic socisty, this widespread 
withdrawal from any form of political engagement was also a 
reaction to being burned politically in the Nazi era. The American 
historian Leonard Krieger describes this mood perceptively: For the 
mass of Germans 
apathy was the rule, an outer lethargy and inner emptiness so 
pervasive as to indicate not simply a state of shock in the 
face of catastrophe andthe deadening routine of daily 
exercise in the face of a crushing struggle for survival, but 
a political withdrawal so profound as to mark the Nazi 
experience off from any traditional authoritarian analogy." 
The postwar elites did not have the option of privatization. 
They had to govern. The republics proclaimed in 1919 were, like 
their predecessors, faced with the problem of creating 2nd fusing a 
comitment to a particular political form with an already existent, 
albeit muted, national identity. This sense of belonging to a 
particular national community, usually sharing a common physical 
territory, language, history, and cuitural values, had been present 
among Germans at least as long as it has amocg many other European 
nations. Such a general national identification had not beea 
linked, however, with a stable unified state and political system. 
Thus, to ensure its own stability, each succeeding political regime 
unsuccessfully sought to broaden the scope of national identifi- 
cation to include a commitment to the given state. The absence of a 
shared attachment to a particular state and political systen has 
thus been the missing component in the German sense of national 
identity. 
The presence of a competing German state (the GDR) within the 
same prewar territory, and its capital in the communist part of the 
historic center of the Reich, complicated the task. West German 
leadership compounded the problem at first by officially 
encouraging support for the values of the liberal democratic 
constitution but not for the specific West German state- Thus in 
effect West-German leadership at least until the 1960s was urging 
citizens to become democrats but not to develop too strong n 
attachment to the Federal Republic because it was only "provi- 
sional" until all Germans were resnited within a single denocratic 
state with Berlin as its capital. Until that time, however, this 
provisional West German state also claimed to be the only legi- 
timate representative for all members of the German nation within 
or outside its borders. This viewpoint was not shared by the 
.leaders of communist East Germany, but apparently it had widespread 
support among East German citizens." 
After the establishment of the two German states in 1949, most 
West Germans gradually accepted the country's division as part of a 
stable status quo and prerequisite far peace. Between 1951 and 1976 
the proportion of the adult population who believed that the 
Federal Republic and East Germany would never be united increased 
from 28 percent to 65 percent." Popular acceptance of the Oder- 
Neisse line (the then de. facto boundary between Poland the East 
Gemany) increased from only 8 percent in 1951 to 61 percent by 
1972.~ By the.early 1970s about two thirds of West Germans had come 
to consider European integration "nore urgentn than German 
unification. Responses to these questions were strongly related to 
age, with younger Germans being far less interested in unification 
than older respondents. 
Public opinion throughout most of the immediate postwar period 
was also indifferent to questions of naticnal identity and their 
symbolic representation. Even in the mid-1950s most Germans repor- 
ted little interest, much less "joy" over. the constitution, natio- 
nal flag or anthem (the Deutschlandlied) than other democratic 
so~ieties.'~ The level of national pride remained well below that 
found in other Western societies, but those Germans who did feel a 
sense of pride focused it on the accomplishments of postwar 
reconstruction. During the 1950s and especially the turbulent 1960s 
it became fashionable for intellectuals to dismiss this West German 
Economic Miracle as a poor substitute for some usually undefined 
idealism they found lacking in the mass public. This same approach 
was taken by their East German counterparts such as Stefan Heym and 
Heiner Miiller after 1989. Yet there is little doubt that economic 
performance, symbolized by the D-Mark, became an important vehicle 
for postwar identification. When asked to characterize what it 
meant to be German or to specify why they were proud to be German, 
respondents repeatedly referred to nhard-work," "diligence," 
"industry" and the "prosperity which we have achieved," 
But more significantly surveys from the 1960s through the 
1980s found an increasingly strong relationship between a West 
German national identity and support for demccratic institutions 
and processes. Those citizens who expressed a sense of national 
pride were nore likely to support the constitution, the country's 
laws and political institutions, the competitive party structure, 
and even the educational system than those Germans with little or 
no pride in being Germac. Comparative studies have also discovered 
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that a sense of national identity and pride is an important 
determinant of social and political integration and ~tability.~ 
Comparable material on a GDR identity is not available due to 
the lack of-survey research under communist dictatorship. The im- 
pressions of observers, policy makers and the fragmentary empirical 
data that were collected suggest that the regime after the Wall and 
especially during the early Honecker era from the early 1970s to 
the mid-1980s had achieved a certain collective sense of self (Wir- 
BewuBtse in )  among segments of the population. But this feeling 
rested on a fundamental ambivalence towards the manifest successes 
and failures of the East German state.61 
Honeckerls "Unity of Economic and Social Policyn brought many 
especially young GDR families their first modern apartment with 
sanitary facilities that did not have to be shared. Funded by 
Soviet oil deliveries and helped by West German credits, the East 
German version of goulash Communism meant improved housing and a 
greater supply of consumer goods in exchange for political docili- 
ty. Expanded travel opportunities to other socialist countries, 
above all Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia showed East Germans 
that they had the right to a certain pride in their own accomp- 
lishments ( A u f b a u s t o l z ) .  Karl-Rudolf Korte emphasizes that this 
feeling owed much to the satisfaction of overcoming adverse 
circumstances: "The majority of the East German population had to 
support its own identity through some kind of idea of what the GDR 
accomplished. It was an identity formed through the shared 
experience of  deprivation^."^ 
The GDR's leadership was never able to steer a straight or 
steady course on the national identity question. Throughout the 
1950s and most of the 1960s it professed its commitment to unifi- 
cation. The-1968 constitution declared that "the GDR and its citi- 
zens. ..strive for the overcoming of the division of Germany forced 
upon the German nation by imperialism." The GDR would pursue "the 
step-by-step rapprocheraent of both German states until their 
unification on the basis of democracy and socialism." Six years 
later (October, 1974) this passage was deleted from the consti- 
tution, which now declared that the GDR was "forever and irre- 
vocably allied with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." All 
references to the "German nationn and to the uiiification of Germany 
were expunged. The GDR was no longer a "socialist state of the 
German nation," but had rather becone a "socialist state of the 
workers and peasants. 
This constitutional change followed from a reorientation in 
1971, when the SED adopted a hard-line ideology and policy of 
complete demarcation (Abgrenzung) - from the Federal Republic. The 
goal of its ideological efforts was "to establish in theoretical 
terms the GDR as a nation-state in its own right." Albert Norden, 
the SED1s chief ideologue as Central Committee Secretary for 
Propaganda, claimed in July, 1972 that Bonn's talk about "national 
unity" was a fiction because "a unified nationn did not exist any 
more, since the "Krupps and the Krauses no longer had anything in 
common." Be rejected the West German claim of a "sense of commu- 
nity" cor because "the feelings of the 
workers in the peoples' own factories are fundamentally different 
from the feelings of the private-capitalistic owners of the 
factories, banks and ship works of the Federal Rep~blic."~ 
This Abgrenzung was conplernented a few years later by an 
effort to caopt certain aspects of the Gerrnan historical and cul- 
tural past;which it was hoped would contribute to the legitimation 
of the GDR regime. Under the slogan of "heritage and tradition" the 
statue of Frederick the Great was returned to Unter den Linden, a 
more balanced biography of Bismarck appeared and in 1983 the 500th 
anniversary of Luther's death was commemorated on a grand scale. 
These "progressiven figures in the German historical record were 
seen as precursors of socialism as practiced in the GDR, but 
Abgrenzung was difficult to square with these reappropriations of a 
common past. By attempting to kindle some spirit of GDR nationa- 
lism, the SED was in fact encouraging East Germans to discover 
-their buried links with the West. 
.Whatever Aufbaustolz the GDR citizenry possessed was clearly 
not the same as a "national consciousness." The events of 1989-1990 
certainly demonstrated that when East Germans could chose, most 
were ready to abandon the socialist experiment. When the social 
contract of continuous increases in the standard of living could no 
longer be maintained, the weakness of loyalties to "real existing 
socialism" and separate statehood were exposed. The socialist 
facade collapsed and in its place far at least three-fourths of the 
GDR population, the German nation became the basis of a common 
self-definition, The vacuum created by the collapse of the SEE 
regime was filled institutionally by West Germans and psycholo- 
gically by a very materialist-based national identification. 
,Since unification the "identity" of East Germans has varied 
with their perception of how the unification process, particularly 
in its economic dimensions, has progressed. During 1990 and the 
first quartsr of 1991 East Germans were caught up with unification 
euphoria. They were more likely to consider themselves German than 
West Germans, i.e., the proportion of East Germans wno felt more 
"German" than "Eastv1 Geman was greater than the proportion of West 
Germans who considered themselves GeAmans rather than West Germans. 
As the prosaic consequences of unification set in with plant 
closings, rising unemployment, lower wages relative to the West and 
media deprecation East German identification with 
Deutscnland declined. Increasingly, East Germans differentiated 
themselves from the West. By 1994-1995, however, the pendulum had 
begun to swing back towards an all German identification. 
In contrast, attempts by political leaders in West Germany to 
reintroduce a "normal nationalism" into the political debate were 
limited to occasional books and feuilleton articles which had a 
very limited impact. Since the Christian Democrats were winning 
(1949, 1953, 1957, 1961, 1965) without any national appeal, they 
had no intention of changing a successful formula: peace, 
prosperity and no experiments! 
Xost mainstream Christian Democrats at this time propagated at 
the elite level the so-called Staatskerntneorie: the Federal Repub- 
lic formed the nucleus for a future all German state, with the 
result that the GDR was seen as situated within the territory of 
the FRG, the laws of which applied de jure ,  if not de facto to the 
East German territory. (Ironically this argument was not used by 
Ge-man prosecutors of GDR officials, judges, generals, border 
guards, secret police after 1990. This claim was found neither in 
the 1973 Basic Treaty nor in the 1990 Unification Treaty, which did 
not dispute, the sovereigEty of the GDR from i949-1989). For the 
first two decades of its existence, this construction made the GDR 
a statefree territory, an occupation zone which required an 
official position of non-recognition toward the GDR and outright 
hostility to any state which did not accept Bonn's approach to the 
GDR (Hall stein doctrine) .G 
Such a cautious approach to the national question was unsa- 
tisfactory to some CDU intellectuals. In 1965 Eugen Gerstenmaier, 
then President of the Bundestag, caused a mini-flap with his book, 
called "New Nationalism? Concerning the Transformation of the 
Germans," in which he made an argument very similar to that put 
forth by Wolfgang Schauble and others after 1989: "If we [Germans] 
want to survive as a nation, we must once again begin to know who 
we are and what we want." Unless a sense of national identity were 
to become part of consciousness, he continued, 
we will, already in this century, be reduced to a perhaps 
quite well functicning, but historically and nationally cpite 
unimportant part of a European consumer society or perhaps to 
a provincial appendage to the American industrial society .... 
In such a state of consciousness a reunification of our people 
and thus the natural and imperative self-realization of the 
Germans as a nation would no longer be possible.& 
What recovering a national identity w~uld mean i n  concrete te-rns 
was never spelled out by Gerstemaier or others during this.period. 
Ironically, the first explicit postwar appeal to national 
s.entirnents occurred during the 1972 campaign with the famous siogan 
"Germans, we can be proud of our country." Apparently written by 
the Social-Democratic candidate Willy Brandt himself, this phrase. 
was quite successful, since it appealed to submerged sentiments in 
a moderate way. Because both Brandt and the SPD enjoyed impeccable 
anti-nationalist and anti-fascist credentials, they could safely 
play the nationalist card. The campaign itself was designed to 
focus the attention of voters on the SPD-FDPTs Ostpolitik of 
reconciliation with Germany's eastern neighbors. 
The SPD1s success with the national theme in 1972 prompted, of 
course, a similar respcnse from the Christian Democrats in 1976. 
Survey research commissioned by the party in 1974 and 1975 found 
that most voters were now comfortable with concepts like "father- 
land" and "patriotism." When asked in 1975 whether fatherland 
"sounds good" or "is out of place in today's world," 60 percent of 
West Germans responded positively to the term, but only 32 percent 
of voters under 30 did soe6' From this research came the Kohl- 
Biedenkopf theme Aus Liebe zu Deutschland in the 1976 election, 
which was continued in various forms in the campaigns of the 1989s. 
In the 1970s and 1980s the growing self-confidence of West 
German leaders was seen in Bonn's increased independence in foreign 
policy. It began with a restrained opposition to America's Vietnam 
policy and continued with efforts to rescue detente from the "Evil 
Empire" rhetoric of the Reagan era. Bonn became very sensitive to 
any moves in Washington -- even in the name of anti-Communism -- 
which would have a negative impact on the Feder'al Republic's 
relations to the East. In spite of strong opposition from the 
Reagan administration, Gentany in 1982 went ahead with plafis .to 
build a massive pipeline system to supply Western Europe with 
natural gas from Siberia. Twenty years earlier Bonn had abandoned a 
similar project because of American opposition.= Following the 
imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981 Bonn refused to join in 
American-led sanctions against Poland and the Soviet Union, and 
instead the Schmidt goverrnent urged Germans to send food parcels. 
Bonn's gczl, of course, was to save Ostpolitik even at the ccst of 
alienating the rising Polish opposition in Solidarity. Riqhtly or 
wrongly, the Federal Republic, started to assert its own interests, 
a behavior consistent with a growing sense of nztional identity. 
On the eve of the collapse of the Wall the once provisional 
Bonn Republic had become a stable, prosperous, and self-confident 
democracy. As Table 1 indicates, the proportion of Germans who were 
proud of the postwar political system had increased substantially 
by 1988. In 1953 only 7 percent expressed pride in some aspect of 
the ~olitical system. Among Americans at that tine the level of 
pride in pclitical institutions was 85 percent and among British 
respondents 4 5  percent were proud of the country's political order. 
By 1978 the German level of pride in their political system has 
risen to 31 percent and in 1988 51 percent of the respondents 
expressed pride in the postwar constitution and political order. 
Table 1 
Sources of National Pride, 1959-1988 (in. percent) 




Economy 33 40 50 
Social Welfare 
Programs 6 18 
Characteristics of 
the People 36 - 
Contributions to 
Science 12 
Contributions - to 
the Arts 11 10 
Other, no answer 43 39 50 
Source: For 1959 and 1978: David P. Conradt, "Changing German 
Political Culture," In Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., The 
Civic Culture ~evisited (Boston, 1980), 230; for 1988: German 
General Social Survey cited in Peter Mohler, "Der Deutschen Stolz: 
Das Grundgesetz," ~n~ormationsdienst Soziale Indikatoren, 2 (July, 
1989) : 1-4, 
It is important to note that by 1988 the political system was 
the area where Germans had the most pride- On the eve of unifica- 
tion, the instititutions of the Federal Republic had even overtaken 
the economy, which had been the greatest source of postwar Geman 
national pride. Support for specific national symbols had also 
grown since 1949. The proportion of Germans stating that they feel 
"joyful" or "happyn when they see their black-red-gold national 
flag increased from 23 percent in 1951 to 60 percent by 1989. Solid 
majorities of Germans now considered national feelings of patric- 
tism and pride to be important. In January, 1989 over 80 percent of 
West Germans felt that they could be just as proud of their country 
as the Americans, British or Fren~h.~' With unification the final 
embargo on the discussion of the nation and nationalism would be 
lifted and a new round of discussions begin. 70 
3. The Double Burden of Memory: 
The unexpected return of history in 1989/90 was bound to shake 
the fragile foundations of the separate post-war loyalties. In 1945 
Hitler's defeat seemed to have ended history, since the dissolution 
of the Third Reich provided a negative closure to national develop- 
ment. Hence the post-war period appeared to many participants +s a 
space beyond history, a timeless moment of recovery thatat best 
constituted a post-script to the completed master narrative of 
Germany. With the fail of the wall, history returned with a ven- 
geance, overthrowing Communisn, liberating suppressed populations 
and redrawing the map of Eastern Europe." The democratic awakening 
proved not only exhilarating but also threatening, since it upset 
- 
Cold War certainties and thereby reopened previously settled 
questions of German identity. 
In spite of the resumption of the national story, unification 
in effect doubled the burden of the German past in the twentieth 
century. As if the scars of the Nazi trauma were not enough, the 
collapse of the GDR added another failed dictatorship, set of col- 
laborators or victims and denands for restitution. Just as personal 
memories or' the Third Reich had begun to fade, fresh recollections 
of suffering under Communist repression took their place and the 
whole practical set of post-45 problems such as purging the civil 
service, persecuting criminal perpetrators and compensating their 
victims appeared to have returned in 1990. Some historians and pub- 
licists began to talk about a aoppelta Vergangen5eitsbewaltigung. a 
double coming to terms with frightening pasts in which experiences 
in dealing with the legacy of the first profoundly affected efforts 
to cope with the remains of the second." 
The public debate during the half-decade after unity has 
therefore been rife with historical allusions. Overwhelmed by the 
unexpected rush to German unity, many Easterners tried to regain 
orientation by reference to a longer time-frame. Just when they 
most needed'a stable perspective, they were forced to realize that 
their larger conceptions of history had also crumbled with the fall 
of the wall. This loss of an accustomed past was more upsetting in 
the East, where the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of law-like 
development of a socialist nation had provided a clear direction 
for the future. Eventually some Western intellectuals also began to 
sense that the return of the national state might challenge their 
predictions of a post-nationai trajectory towards European inte- 
gration as well." The unification shock has therefore triggered a 
broad re-examination of the historical basis of German identities. 
Since the shadows of the past could hardly be exorcized in ge- 
neral, this reconsiaeraticn surfaced in several specific debates. 
The ways in which painful events would be privately recalled, pub- 
licly discussed and politically memorialized offer clues to the 
role of the past in shaping the identity of a united Gemany. The 
first area of soul-searching was the commemoration of World War Two 
which fcrcea Germans to confront their own role in Hitler's car- 
nage, because their neighbors insisted on celebrating their vic- 
tory. In contrast to the emotional war-guilt debate about starting 
World War One, virtually everyone has, however, continued to accept 
Hitler's responsiblity for unleashing the second -mageddon. If 
there was a controversy, it focused on the reasons for the Russian 
campaign in 1941 instead. Though some rightist commentators allege 
that the Nazi attack only forestalled a planned Soviet in~asion,'~ 
the public seemed unwilling to follow the tortured logic of such 
apologetics. 
The evaluation of the German resistance prcvoked more heated 
altercations. While some outside observers have remained skeptical 
about the existence of wide-spread opposition to the Third Reich, 
both German successor states had drawn their legitimacy from 2 
specific interpretation of the Widerstand. Seat on proving that it 
was the better anti-fascist Germany, the GDR had represented itself 
as the fulfillment of the dreams of the Communist resistance, wide- 
spread in working class circles. Interested in the continuity of 
national traditions, the FRG had instead celebrated the officers, 
bureaucrats and trade-union leaders that tried to assassinate 
Hitler in Suly 1944. When the resistance memorial in West Berlin 
dared to dedicate a small room to Comzllunist opponents of the NS 
regime, conservative circles denounced such a broadening of memory 
as an insult to Hitler's bourgeois opponents." But after much nedia 
discussion, liberal intellectuals succeeded in upholding the more 
inclusive version. 
The commemoration of the War's end proved eqially controver- 
sial, since it posed the alternative of defeat or liberation. %bile 
most Germans were relieved to have survived t h e  killing, many sol- 
diers and some civilians had experienced May of 1945 as the loss of 
the war. In contrast to such private feelings, the official histo- 
ries of both Geman states saw the allied victory primarily as lib- 
eration from Nazi dictatorship, only disagreeing on which savior to 
thank most. After unification the tenor of this debate shifted 
somewhat and for the first time personal memories of victimization 
through saturation bombing, lengthy imprisonment or mass expulsion 
from the East could be talked about openly. Interestingly enough, 
this outpouring of recollections of German suffering did not foster 
revanchist sentiment, but rather reinforced President Weizsacker's 
paradoxicai formula of liberation through defeat.j6 
On the'whole, recent remembrances of the Second World War have 
become nore inclusive rather than more nationalist. No doubt, there 
were some symbolic f aux  pas, such as Chancellor Kohl's misplaced 
desire to participate in the Normandy observances which Fran~ois 
Mitterrand satisfied with a separate ceremony. But in the meantime 
critical intellectuals were able to attack the last taboo of the 
Second World War by charging that the Wehmacht actively partici- 
pated in the racial war of annihilation in the East. A provocative 
Hamburg exhibition showed countless snap-shots from individual 
soldiers that document military participation in persecution and 
e~termination.~' In spite of attempts to discredit Communist claims 
so as to establish the Western version of events, the commemoration 
of World War Two did not lead to revanchist outbursts but generally 
supported a reconciliation between the erstwhile belligerents.= 
A second sensitive area of public debate, the issue of compli- 
city in the Holocaust continues to be more difficult to discuss. 
After years of NS propaganda, Germans had found the horrifying pic- 
tures, disclosed at the liberation of the camps and broadcast du- 
ring the Nurenberg Trials, hard to believe. While accusations of 
survivors against the worst of the SS perpetrators could be dealt 
with through legal channels, questions about the role of the major- 
ity of the "decent" people proved disturbing, since they touched 
virtually eueryone. In contrast to the nightmares of the victims, 
focused on their persecution, the recollections of most bystanders 
involve other kinds of suffering such as losing family members in 
the fighting or bombing as well as rape, expulsion and hunger. Sup- 
ported only by a critical minority, demands for atonement were 
therefore seen as largely coming from the outside. (Unfortunately 
the controversy around the Goldhagen book has served to reinforce 
this -view. ) '' 
The two successor states were therefore only partly successful 
in dealing with these painful questions of German guilt. In the 
East the SED claimed to build a better Germany on the basis of 
anti-Fascist commitment that provided a clean break with the Nazi 
past.--In spite of a rigorous persofinel purge in jilstice and educa- 
tion, GDR practice did not live up to the ideal, since assigning 
guilt to "monopoly capitalism" absolved the mzjority of the people 
and failed to take anti-Semitism serio~sly.~~ In the West, the iess 
thorough process of denazification allowed minor Nazis to survive . 
and the rejection of collective guilt covered the sins of collabo- 
rztion with silence. But a massive restitution program paid bil- 
lions of DM to Jewish victims and eventually the critical minority 
succeeded in forcing a more honest confrontation with complicity in 
education or the media and in beating back revisionist efforts in 
the Historikerstrei t ." 
The effect of unification on this complex set of evasions and 
self-incriminations has been uneven. Once again the consequences 
have been more dramatic in the East, since the fall of the wall 
exposed the -"instrumentalizationn of anti-fascism by the SED. Dur- 
ing four GDR decades, genuine revulsion against Eitler had turned 
into a justification for a one-party dictatorship that provided an 
unchallengeable air of superior morality.= Portraying the Third 
Reich as the product of monopoly-capitalism justified the Communist 
expropriation of Junkers and factory owners in order to destroy the 
social basis of Nazism. At the same time, anti-Fascism offered a 
brown brush for tarring the Federal Republic with accusations of 
neo-Nazism. Since the democratic awakening in the fall of' 1989' 
discredited anti-Fascism as an instrument of repression, it is 
unclear whether it also rendered the credibility of broader 
critiques of the Nazi past suspect. 
In the West revisionist gfforts have been mable to shake the 
public commitment to confronting the Holocaust. Initially Jewish 
fears that the crimes of the second dictatorship would overshadow 
the atrocities of the first seemed borne out by neo-conservative 
calls for an end to German self-mutilation. However, commemorations 
of the liberation of concentration camps like auchenwald nave kept 
the issue of German guilt in the public eye. The re-dedication of 
the Berlin memorial Neue Wache from victims of Fsscism to ail vic- 
tims of war and repression may represent some dilution of the sin- 
gularity of Jewish victimhood by referring also to German suffe- 
ring. But public clamor for the construction cf a huge Holocaust 
memorial close to the Brandenburg Gate shows continued awareness of 
the need for a central place of symbolic memory. While this project 
is currently stalled by personal and artistic jealousies, its real- 
ization seems only a matter of time.= 
The effect of the public controversies about Holocaust remem- 
brance on popular attitudes is difficult to determine. Based on 
several surveys, a recent study concludes that the pessimist thesis 
of deniai is inaccurate, since infornation about German 
responsibility for genocide is wide-spread and anti-Semitism is 
lower than in some other Western countries. As a legacy of prior 
indoctrination East Germans show a higher degree of anti-Fascist 
responses than West Germans, although even these still do compara- 
tively well. On the Left, an unprejudiced minority of urban, 
younger =d educated respondents has internalized a "Holocaust- 
identity" that accepts the shame of its fathers. In the middle an 
"ambivalent" and less clearly demarcated group knows about Nazi 
crimes and is not openly prejudiced, but wants "to draw a line" 
under the terrible past. The danger comes from the Right, where 
less than lopercent in the East and about double that number in the 
West resent the burden of guilt and snow remnants of anti-Semitic 
biases .84 
A third area of contention is the legacy of "real existing so- 
cialism." Coping with the debris of the GDR has proven particularly 
difficult, because it involves, ccntrary to ideological expecta- 
tions, a failed dictatorship of the Left. Even if its imprisonment 
of much of the population seemed reprehensible, the SED-state could 
count on progressive sympathies, since it claimed to follow 
Enlightenment ideals of equality and fraternity. While dyed-in-the- 
wool capitalists are triumphant about the collapse of Communism, 
leftist intellectuals are discouraged by the defeat of this im- 
perfect version of their drezm~.*~ The task is further complicated 
by altercations over Ostpolitik, with defenders claiming that the 
easing of human contacts undermined and critics asserting that the 
de-facto recognition of the SED stabilized the East German regime. 
Though the Left had a method to soften the border, it lacked the 
will to overthrow the SED, while the Right.haa the will but coula 
not find a method to topple the Communists. 
The media have largely reduced the discussion about the GDR to 
the Stasi-issue. Playing on the victims1 resentment of the secret 
police, sensationalist disclosures have tainted the Eastern elite 
with collaboration so that hardly any prominent figure has escaped 
unscathed. Already during 1990 GDR politicians like CDU leader 
Lothar de Maiziere were \oustedf and subsequently such celebrities 
as the bobsledder Harald Czudaj or the writers Christa Wolf, Heiner 
Miiller and Sascha Anderson were found to have Seen informal infor- 
mants. To establish a checking procedure the unification treaty 
established a special "Federal Deputy for Secret Service Docu- 
ments," popularly known as the Gauck-office according to its direc- 
tor.% Bitter discussions about the ambiguous role of Brandezburg 
SPD premier Manfred Stolpe or PDS leader Gregor Gysi have poisoned 
the climate of post-unification politics. Public furor over any 
Stasi connection has tended to make discussion of the actual 
quality of complicity difficult. 
In spite of a resolve to do better the second time around, the 
courts have experienced great difficulties in punishing violations 
of human rights by officials of the communist regime. Since the 
mass of records left by the collapse of the GDR made it possible to 
document transgressions, prosecutors were able to initiate numerous 
cases. While the judiciary did hand down modest sentences against 
the soldiers whoshot fieeing East Germans at the Wall, it only 
succeeded in condemning for minor offenses those members of the' SED 
leadership that were not too old to stand trial. Prominent defen- 
dants like Wolfgang Vogel or Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski 
protracted litigation and ultimately the Federal Supreme Court 
absolved most of the GDR's foreign espionage." The key problem 
. - turned out to be the legal basis of the proceedings: Since the 
.-. ... Unification Treaty stipulated that when defendants had violated 
- East German laws, they couid be held accountable, the courts proved 
generally helpless when contested actions were previously legal. 
-, As a positive alternative offering infomation and education, 
-. the Bundestag in 1993 convened a special commission of inquiry into 
the GDR as political system. Led by the East Geman oppositioc 
pastor Rainer Eppelmann (CDU) , this Enquetekommission, composed of 
legislators and historians, held a series of hearings into the 
basic features of the SED-state. Prompted by numerous specialists' 
briefs, commission members questioned prominent figures of the 
prior regime such as Hans Modrow (PDS) sought to defend their 
actions. Since the sessions were covered by television, these 
charges reached a broader audience than newspaper commentary or 
academic analysis. But with the approach of the 1994 electioc, the 
debates deteriorated into partisanship, with the CDU picturing 
Communism as evil, the SPD defending its Ostpolitik and the TDS 
claiming to be victimized." Split into competing majority and 
minority reports, the verdict remained inconclusive, forcing the 
commission to continue its work. 
Much of-the public debate is dominated by an accusatory dis- 
course which paints the GDR as a repressive regime, an Unrechts- 
staat. This critical recollection is primarily promoted by prior 
opponents of the SED in the civic movement and.by Western a~ti-Com- 
munists who knew all along that it was wrong. Their language tends 
to be emotional, generalizing harshly about the fundamental illegi- 
timacy of the East Gerrgan regime. Its theoretical justification is 
a revived totalitarianism theory.which, in the writings of Hannah 
Arendt, Carl Friedrich or Zbigniev Brezhinski, equated Fascist with 
Stalinist dictatorship during the hey-day of the Cold War. The po- 
litical implication of such a condemnatory approach is the 
discrediting of everything East Gerinan and the demand for its 
replacement with superior Western practices. Instead of a flawed 
anti-Fascism the hardliners advocate anti-totalitarianism as the 
political consensus of the new ~ermany.'' 
Against such accusations, other voices are trying to establish 
a counter-discourse which sees the GDR in a more positive light. 
For many East Germans, especially intellectuals, and some Western 
sympathizers, the SED-system was instead a "noble experiment" 'that 
only failed due to unfortmate circamstances and mistaken policies. 
  he rhetoric of these GDR defenders is more subdued, citing posi- 
tive counter-examples like full employment or greater equality of 
incomes as basis for a more generous judgment. The apologists 
reject comparisons with the Third Reich as oversimplifications and 
insist on the progressive aspirations of the socialist tradition 
while simultaneously distancing themselves from the excesses of its 
faulty implementation. The political purpose of this discourse is 
the regeneration of a post-Marxist opposition to Western coloni- 
zation and the relegitimation of alternatives to capitalist ex- 
ploitation. 90 
Some commentators also argue for B more differentiated view of 
the GDR that tries to avoid negative or positive myth-making. In 
rhe East especially reform communists and in the West primarily 
members of the moderate left see the East German state as a set of 
a irresolvable contradictions between admirable and deplorable 
'., traits. Their language attempts to be more dispassionate in order 
to come to terms with the complexities and ambiguities of the sub- 
ject. Departing from a comparative perspective of a modern dicta- 
torship, they see one-party rule not just as repression from the 
top but also as cooperation and/or resistance on the bottom. In po- 
litical terms, these moderates wm-t to sort out which GDR attri- 
butes were i~umane and which others might be worth preserving for 
the future. Half a decade after unification, proponents of condem- 
nation, amnesia and critical historicization continue to struggle 
for public and academic a~cendancy.~' 
A final battleground is the issue of renationalization of Ger- 
man identity. The unexpected restoration of the national state has 
posed the question of what to do with a political organization that 
was thought to have been left behind. The rush to German unity in 
1990 not only overwhelmed the GDR theory 'of a separate "socialist 
nation" but also threw the F%G thesis of a "postnaticnal" self- 
consciousness into doubt.% The reconceptualization of the mission 
of the central historical museums illustrates this dilemma. The 
exhibition of the East Berlin Armory which showed the growth of 
socialist separatism quickly had to be closed; but Helmut Kohl's 
plans for a post-modern museum of national history in West Berlin 
also had to be dropped so that its contents could be used to 
refurbish the Eastern Zeughaus as a showplace of the national past; 
and finally the "House of History" in Bonn which was to celebrate a 
distinctive Western sense of self had to be transformed through the 
addition of GDR material into a memorial to post-war partition. 
Under the bznner of "normalizaticn" the Riqht is vigorously 
promoting a return to a national identity. Viewing the nation as a 
"natural" category; many conservatives hail unification as the end 
of the aberration of division and therefore cali for a self-con- 
scious resumption of a chastened version of German traditions. For 
instance, CDU leader Wolfgang Schauble asserts that "the bond xhich 
holds a conununity together and creates identity.is the nation." In 
foreign policy, this reorientation motivates the re-emergence of 
geopolitical thought-patterqs about Gemany as land of the middle 
and inspires calls for greater assertiveness in the.name of pre- 
sumed "national interests.." Domestically, such an attitude supports 
an affirmative perspective to the German past that minimizes prob- 
lematic legacies and it feeds a sense cf ethnic.exclusiveness to- 
wards foreigners.- While the rightist fringe aggressively promotes 
this renationalization, less extrene versions of such views are 
also starting to influence centrist circles to some degree. 
In contrast, a defensive Left tries to cling to its rejection 
of nationalism. Understanding the nation as a constructed category, 
intellectuals blame nationalism for the disasters of Geman history 
and warn insistently against falling back into national categories. 
For example, Giinter Grass, who once propagated the maintenance of 
cultural ties tot he East, invokes Auschwitz as symbol of the 
Holocaust to oppose unification by arguing that a return to nation- 
state thinking would automatically lead to similar disasters. 
Abroad, critics oppose the use of military force on the basis of 
the neighbors' recollections of World War Two and promote a wider 
European or international consciousness. At home, they advocate 
openness to immigration and multiculturai cooperation between the 
various ethnic groups that make up about 8percent of all the people 
living in the FRG.~ In effect, intellectuals want to retain their 
regional or trans-national pre-unification identiti'es . 
Between these.fronts, some moderates are trying to establish a 
democratic patriotism. Aware of the terrible excesses of nationa- 
lism in the past, they nonetheless argue for a "new foundation of 
the German nztion" in order to stabilize the enlarged FRG. In this 
vein, the East Berlin SPD spokesman and theologian Richard Schroder 
calls for accepting his "difficult fatherland" with both its guilt 
and achievements. On the one hand these intermediaries find the 
intellectuals' "constitutional patriotism" too cold to provide a 
firm basis for popular loyalty to democracy, which according to 
Western examples also requires emotional bonding. But on the other 
hand, they reject the ethnic nationalism of the Right in favor of a 
coastitutional patriotism which propagates an open conception cf 
citizenship that accepts multicultural differences.= Such moderates 
want to prevent the return of a militant nationalism so to speak 
through an inoculation with democratic patriotism. 
Five years after unification it is still unclear which of 
these tendencies will win out in the long run. To gain support, re- 
ilationalization advocates have claimed to be speaking for a nore 
traditionalist generation of 1989 which is trying to undo the 
damage wrought by its rebellious predecessor, the generation of 
1968. On closer inspection the fronts in this generational struggle 
for opinion leadership are curiously reversed. It is the aging 
former radicals who occupy many key positions in the media or in 
academe and who are now trying to defend their post-national con- 
ceptions against a neo-conservative group of younger intellectilals 
in their 30s and 40s who use their national battle-cry to advance 
their own careers." Ironically, the really young in their late 
teens and early twenties have hardly taken sides so far, nzking the 
outcome of this conflict between the self-styled generations uncer- 
tain. 
Instead of a massive shift back to the nation, there have been 
subtle signs of a gradual de-tabuization of national feelings. 
Media anxiety about the ugly and deplorable incidents of xenophobiz 
may be somewhat misleading, since opinion surveys show that such 
feelings are limited to a small minority. The electoral failure of 
the neo-Xazi parties 2nd the, outpouring of mass support for tolo- 
rance show that the skin-head milieu is limited to dispirited 2nd 
unemployed youths, supported by some incorrigible adults." Instead, 
what has been noticeable is greater pride and useof national syn- 
bols during international sports events such as the European soccer 
championships, such as the waving of black-red-gold flags and 
choruses of "Deutschland, Deutschland." Also Chancellor Kohi's 
references to the word "fatherland" no longer seem quite as quaint 
as before and in a linguistic shift the word "Germany" is making 
somewhat of a comeback as a self-evident category, without first 
having tc be defined politically. 
4. Living with the Ghosts: 
What does the burden of history suggest for the restructuring 
of German identities in'the last decade of the twentieth century? 
In contrast to the legacy of other democracies, the German past is 
hardly a source of pride or inspiration, but rather an occasion for 
collective embarrassment and shame. While medieval glories seem 
safe enough and there is much early modern artistic creativity and 
scientific achievenent to admire, more recent times are deeply 
problematic due to their politicai instability that culminated in 
two dictatorships. It is a continuing irrita~t that the bulk of the 
German population collaborated willingly with the Third Reicn and 
everi the SED-regime could draw some internal support from the le- 
gacy of Marx and the K P D . ~  The experience of this double repression 
has left more ghosts, complicating self-conceptions, than in those 
countries where it was imposed largely from the outside. 
In long-term perspective, the unexpected reunification once 
again rearranged cultural patterns of identity. The excesses of 
Hitler's aggression and genocide had so discredited the Barbarossa 
myth as tc break off the ethnic straia of nationalism after 1945. 
Surprisingly quickly the very term Reich disappeared from political 
vocabulary, sounding out of place where it remained as in the GDR 
railroad, the Reichsbahn. Instead the Germans were thrown back upon 
the 18th-century notion of the Kulturnation, a cultural unity sus- 
tained by intellectuals speaking a common language. Coming to terms 
with the terrible Nazi legacy was one of the strongest bonds, uni- 
ting East and West during aivision. While both post-war states 
claimed to carry on the Schillerian tradition, it was the Western 
version of capitalist democracy that eventually succeeded in reali- 
zing Tell's imperative.- The rejection of the imperial myth made it 
possible to progress from cultural community once more to political 
freedcm combined with unity. 
The historical foundation of this democratic nation state is, 
however, fiercely contested. In the construction of a new master 
narrative, alternative memories confront one another in a battle 
for cultural hegemony over united Germany. The Right generally 
wants to return to those national traditions that were not tar- 
nished too badly and promotes assertive and ethnically exclu- 
sive stance. The slogan of normalization implies leaving behind the 
traumas the past and constructing new German identity out 
the purified materials of a nation state. In contrast the Left 
wishes to hold on to a post-war post-nationalism that had fled from 
German self-conceptions towards new American, Communist or European 
identities. In the critical perspectives, the terrors of history 
prohibit any resumption of normalcy and forever mandate a German 
sense of guilt and contrition. In a nutshell, current struggles re- 

quirement of military service, states tend to promote the loyalty 
of their citizens. Though the enlarged FRG is far from unleashing 
nationalist propaganda, civic education is bound to propagate a 
sense of collective responsibility, if only to justify financial 
transfers to the ~ast.'" Does not the entire debate about the 
prospects of internal unity revolves around the presumption of a 
common destiny? 
Ultimately, the current reconfiguration depends to a conside- 
rable degree upon which lessons are learned from Germany's trauma- 
tic history. So far, foreign fears of the establishment of a 
"Fourth Reichn have proven grossly exaggerated since the neo-Nazi 
movement is smaller than its counterparts in Italy or France.lo3 At 
the same time, attempts to perpetuate a post-national stance via 
Holocaust guilt seem to evoke fewer responses, since they imply the 
perpetuatior. of a negative German exreptionalism. The current 
challenge is rather to develip a chastened version of identity that 
accepts the entirety of the past, with all its achievements and 
disasters, as a mandate for a nore peaceful future. In order to 
"pay off our debts togeizher" the East German theologian Richard 
Schroder ccunsels: "We have to unite our histories." If they 
foreswear external hegenony for the sake of European cooperation 
and renour.ce internal exclusiveness in favor of nulticultural 
ope-mess, the new Germans at last have a chance to construct a more 
stable sense, of their identities ."'" 
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